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Abstract
We examine training and recruitment policies in a two-period model that nests
two forms of production, "routine" work where ability and e¤ort are substitutes and
"creative" work where they are complements. Alternative ways of improving average
ability have opposite implications for agentscareer concerns. While teaching to the
top (training complementary to ability) or identifying star performers increases agents
career concerns, teaching to the bottom has the opposite e¤ect. The paper also makes
more general comments relating to models of reputation.
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In the next decade and beyond, the ability to attract, develop, retain and
deploy sta¤ will be the single biggest determinant of a professional service
rms success.
Maister [1997] p.189
1 Introduction
Popular press and academic literature have come to stress the importance of recruitment
and development of sta¤ in industries where human capital plays a critical role.1 This
popular literature tends to recommend recruiting the best and training them. There
are, of course, costs as well as benets to recruitment and training. In this paper, we
highlight that there may be indirect costs and benets through the e¤ect on employees
incentives. Thus, the central contribution of this paper is to highlight that in addition to
a¤ecting the quality of sta¤, training and recruitment policies also play a role in a¤ecting
the behaviour of employees through their career concern incentives.
In human capital intensive industries including professional services such as the law,
audit, consulting, and architecture, career concern incentives are of paramount importance.
As discussed in Fama [1980] and Holmström [1982/99], agents may exert e¤ort in trying
to persuade future employers that they are of high ability, that is, they may be motivated
by career concerns.2 It is clear that their motivation will depend on the beliefs of potential
future employers; and a principal contribution of this paper is to note that recruitment
1This literature includes Michaels et al. [2001], Maister [1997], Smart [1999], Hacker [2001] and no doubt
many others.
2A wide literature has extended and considered applications of the career concerns framework. Most
relevant to this paper, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole [1999] provide a thorough analysis characterizing
the impact of di¤erent information structures (mappings from ability and e¤ort into observable outcomes).
Others have focused on specic applications, whose primary e¤ect is to alter such information structures, in
particular through teamwork (Meyer [1994] and Jeon [1996]) and delegation of power (Ortega [2003], Blanes-
i-Vidal [2007]). More recently Harstad [2007], Casas-Arce [2005] and Martinez [2005] consider di¤erent
micro-foundations for career concerns models with non-linear returns functions and their implications.
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and training policies will change these.
In particular, we highlight that while many di¤erent training and recruitment policies
might have the same e¤ect on the average level of ability of employees, they can have very
di¤erent (and indeed exactly opposite) implications for incentives.
Our model allows us to present and discuss two di¤erent kinds of training or produc-
tivity enhancement. One that a¤ects an employees core knowledgethat is valuable for
tasks which do not require e¤ort, and another that raises productivity for work that does
require e¤ort. We show that whichever policy is most e¤ective in raising the overall pro-
ductivity of those workers who are already most productive will lead to higher incentives
for employees. Similarly, recruitment policies that are more focused on nding the very
best workers lead to higher incentives for employees and recruitment policies that ensure
that the least able are seldom recruited reduce employeesincentives.
There are two channels through which training can have an e¤ect. First, training
that is geared towards the most able increases the dispersion of the possible types of an
employee so that observations are more informative. Second, training the top implies there
is a greater pecuniary payo¤ to revealing yourself to be there. Recruitment policies that
focus on identifying superstars rather than identifying inept performers have similar e¤ects
through both channels.
We can distinguish between di¤erent training policies and highlight that the key is the
e¤ect on the most productive since our model nests two models of production. One in
which ability substitutes for e¤ort (one might think in this case of ability as signifying
knowledge of a routine task) and another in which ability and e¤ort are complements (one
might think of more able agents in this case as more likely to have the inspiration which
allows hard work to reap rewards).
The career concerns literature and most of the reputation literature has viewed e¤ort
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and ability as substitutes. However, more recent literature on reputational concerns in
e¤ect takes the opposite view and suggests that this view of reputation might lead to
somewhat di¤erent e¤ects.3 In particular Mailath and Samuelson [2001] show that when
reputation is a concern to avoid appearing inept then in a nite-horizon model reputation
e¤ects cannot arise. Further, Moav and Neeman [2005] suggest that more precise infor-
mation can reduce incentives. We discuss at some length how our di¤erent views of the
production process relate to this recent literature on reputation. Further, we make the
methodological point that when e¤ort and ability are not perfect complements, reputation
e¤ects do arise and are similar to the substitutes case.
2 Model
We introduce a two period model with a continuum of types of agents parameterized by
t 2 [0; 1]. Specically in Period 1 a type t agent will have no strategic decision to make
with probability t and in this case will succeed (for example by producing a high quality
product) with probability  and fail with probability 1   . Otherwise (with probability
1  t) the agent must make an e¤ort decision. Note that she only gets to make a strategic
decision when her e¤ort has an e¤ect; or, equivalently, she knows which kind of task she is
performing before she takes her e¤ort decision.4 In this latter case, when she chooses e¤ort
e, she succeeds with probability  + e. Thus overall a t-type agent exerting e¤ort e when
given the opportunity to exert e¤ort would succeed with probability t+(1  t)(+e) and
fail otherwise. E¤ort is costly and, specically, exerting e¤ort e costs the agent e
2
2 , where
 < 1  .
3See, in particular, Tadelis [2002], Mailath and Samuelson [2001] and Bar-Isaac [2007].
4Similar results can be obtained when the agent does not know her own type and does not know which
kind of task she faces. If she knows her own type but does not know the kind of task that she faces then
di¤erent types would make di¤erent e¤ort decisions.
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Let g(t) denote the distribution function for the types of agent and let T denote the
average type (according to the ex-ante beliefs) T =
R 1
0 tg(t)dt and let V =
R 1
0 (t T )2g(t)dt
denote the variance of this prior distribution. This distribution function of types is common
knowledge among the agent and employers.
Employers are risk neutral, value a success at 1 and a failure at 0 and they Bertrand
compete for the agents service in each period.5 Moreover, outcomes are observable but
e¤ort is not observable and contracts are incomplete, so that in e¤ect an agent is paid
in advance at a wage which is simply the employers common belief that the agent will
produce a success.
There are two periods of trade, and outcomes are observed (and beliefs revised) in
between the two periods.6 Specically, timing is as follows:
1. Period 1
(a) employers Bertrand compete for the agents service
(b) the agent decides the level of e¤ort if appropriate (that is if it is a task where
e¤ort will make a di¤erence)
(c) success/failure commonly observed
(d) employers update beliefs according to Bayes rule
2. Period 2: employers Bertrand compete for the agents service
Notice that in period 2, we could allow the agents the opportunity to exert e¤ort but
no agent would do so. Note that whether the agent knows her type or not would have
5 It is su¢ cient to consider two employers bidding for the services of a single employee. More generally,
the assumption that employers Bertrand compete for the product is not crucial, similar results would hold so
long as the price paid was increasing in the customersexpected likelihood that the agent will be successful.
6One need not take the two periods of the model literally, rather the second period can be thought of
as a reduced form payo¤ for a given reputation level, albeit one that is linear in the reputation.
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no e¤ect on this model since she has no ability to signal her type (we rule out long-term
and outcome contingent contracts) and at the point where an agent has to make an e¤ort
decision then the problem is identical for all types.
We suppose that the agent weighs the two periods equally and maximizes the sum
of prots for the two periods. We solve for the e¤ort exerted in the Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
2.1 Interpreting the model
It is worth highlighting that type t captures the agents likelihood of getting an opportunity
to engage in strategic behaviour. One cannot interpret a high t as low or high ability until
all the parameters of the model are specied
The model is intended to reect that agents might be confronted with a variety of
di¤erent tasks, and the nature of the particular task undertaken is unobserved by employers.
For example, employers hiring consultants nd it di¢ cult to determine the extent to which
the project that they are assigning is a complex one or a simple one. Similarly, the di¢ culty
of the project depends on the consultants ability and experience. Depending on the value
of , the model allows for somewhat di¤erent interpretations of the productive process and
of the interpretation of high values of t as reecting high or low ability.
Specically, when  is su¢ ciently high, high t reects high ability; an agent with a high
value of t nds it costless to succeed in a wide range of tasks, in this case ability and e¤ort
are substitutes and an agent would like employers to believe that she has a high value of t.
One could think of this case as representing routinework, where more able workers know
how to do more things and if they know how to perform the task that they are assigned
they will succeed with high probability.7 If they do not have the requisite knowledge they
7Another interpretation for the high  case is that agents with a high t get it right rst time, but for
all agents when they do not, there is the opportunity of exerting e¤ort to try to x mistakes.
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could exert e¤ort to acquire it, by reading the appropriate manuals for example. Examples
include translation work, mechanics, and routine work in low levels of management in an
organizational hierarchy.
In contrast, when  is su¢ ciently low, then one can think of agents for whom (1  t) is
higher as being more able, and e¤ort and ability as complements. In this case even if the
agent has some understanding of the task, exerting e¤ort will still improve the outcome,
however if she has no understanding of the task then she will surely fail. Here, one needs
some ability in order to have any chance of success (one needs ability to have the ash of
inspiration) but this in itself will not guarantee success, hard work is also required. This
may be more appropriate for creative work, such as writing a Ph.D., writing advertisements
or high level management which is not routine.
Note, that in the case that  = 0, the agent would prefer employers to believe that she
is a type with a low value of t and so when  = 0, one should think of agents with low
values of t as more able.
In application, of course many jobs will include elements of both creative and routine
work, however for di¤erent jobs or at di¤erent times in an individuals career (or within an
organizational hierarchy) it will be more appropriate to think of work as primarily of one
or other of these two production types.
In both these cases we can think of more able agents as having facility in some tasks
but not in others. The di¤erence in productivity for a task in which one has facility and in
which one does not when exerting no e¤ort (which is the case in period 2) is simply given
by j  j.
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3 Equilibrium analysis
Trivially, when faced with an e¤ort decision, all agents make the same choice of e¤ort.
This follows since the benets, as determined by equilibrium beliefs following success and
failure, are identical for all agents and the costs are identical for all agents, even though
the frequency with which they have to make such decisions alters.
Suppose that employers anticipate that agents exert e¤ort x when they have an oppor-
tunity to exert e¤ort in the rst period. Then using Bayesrule and rearranging terms,
and as proven in Appendix A, the wages that employers would pay following a success and
failure respectively are given by:
S(x) : = + (  )

T +
    x
+ x+ T (    x)V

, and (1)
F (x) : = + (  )

T       x
1    x  T (    x)V

(2)
An agents problem, where relevant, is to choose e to maximize
(+ e)S(x) + (1    e)F (x)  e
2
2
. (3)
The rst order condition yields that e = S(x)  F (x) and a rational expectations equilib-
rium is dened by the e¤ort level x that satises:
x

= S(x)  F (x). (4)
Given this characterization, the following results ensue (and are proven in the Appen-
dix).
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Proposition 1 Equilibrium e¤ort is well-dened and unique. Further (i) The equilibrium
e¤ort e is lower than the e¢ cient solution efb = . (ii) If  >  then  > + e.
Note in particular that since equilibrium e¤ort is unique, comparative statics exercises
are well dened and can be explored. Note, further, as discussed at some length in Section
2.1, that in the case where  is high ( > ) or  is low ( < ) the model has natural
interpretations as capturing routineand creativeproduction respectively. Finally, note
that when conducting these comparative statics results, we assume that parameters remain
common knowledge among all agents, employers and potential employers; in particular, in
the context of Sections 5.1 and 5.2, when we consider a rm choosing a recruitment or
training strategy, it is assumed that these choices are known and understood by all market
participants.
4 Comparative Static Results
The rst result is a very intuitive one, if e¤ort is less costly then the agent will exert more
e¤ort (when relevant) in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium e¤ort e is increasing in 
Proof. It is convenient to dene h(x) := S(x)  F (x)  x .
Note that by the arguments of the proof of Proposition 1, h(x) is decreasing in the
range (0; ). Using the Implicit Function Theorem de

da =  
@h(a)
@a
@h(e)
@e
and since @h(e)@e < 0, the
sign of de

da is simply the sign of
@h(x;a)
@a and so it is su¢ cient to consider that expression for
a = , that is to consider @h(x;)@ . Recall
h(x) =  x

+ S(x)  F (x). (5)
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and so taking the derivative with respect to , we obtain
@h(x; )
@
=
x
2
> 0 (6)
Therefore, we conclude that the optimal e¤ort e is increasing in :
Next we turn to comparative statics with respect to V . The intuition here is clear, the
greater the variance in the distribution of types, the more scope that the observation of a
success or failure has to shift beliefs and the associated rewards. This is a familiar intuition
(from Holmström [1982/99] for example). Here we highlight that the result depends on V
and no other characteristics of the distribution (in particular, we do not restrict that g(:)
be Normal).
Proposition 3 The optimal e¤ort e is increasing in V .
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 2, the sign of de

dV is simply the sign of
@h(x;V )
@V .
Taking the derivative with respect to V yields:
@h
@V
=
@(S   F )
@V
=
(  )(    x)
[(    x)T + (+ x)] [(1    x)  (    x)T ] > 0. (7)
Notice that while increasing V or  has a clear monotonic e¤ect on e¤ort, the compar-
ative statics with respect to other parameters depend on which of the two interpretations
alluded to in the description of the model in Section 2 applies, that is, whether an agents
reputational concern is to try to convince employers that she is a high ttype or a low
ttype.
First, we consider comparative statics with respect to . Underlying the following result
are two e¤ects, rst that it is more important to show oneself to be at the top of the ability
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distribution (or having facility in a greater range of tasks that is high t in the case when 
is high, low t in the case when  is low) the greater the di¤erence between the productivity
of an agent in a task in which she has facility and her productivity in one which she does
not, regardless of her level of e¤ort (that is the greater is j    xj for all e¤ort levels x).
Secondly as j    xj increases then an observation of success or failure becomes more
informative. We distinguish explicitly between these two e¤ects in the discussion in Section
5.3. In particular therefore when  is high, one would expect that an increase in  should
reduce e¤ort, but when  is low, it would increase equilibrium e¤ort. Note however that in
all cases, increasing  raises the average productivity of the agent. Similar considerations
apply with regard to comparative statics in . The proposition below demonstrates that
these intuitions are borne out.
Proposition 4 Equilibrium e¤ort is increasing in  but decreasing in  when  <  but
decreasing in  and increasing in  when  > .
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 2, it is su¢ cient to consider @h@ , and
@h
@ .
@h(x;)
@ =
@(S F )
@ =
h
(  x)V
(  x)T++x +
(  x)V
1  x (  x)T
i
+(  )
h
(+x)V
((  x)T++x)2 +
(1  x)V
(1  x (  x)T )2
i (8)
Notice that the denominators are always positive. Since, by Proposition 1(ii) when  > 
then also  >  + x, it follows that in this case @(S F )@ > 0. If instead,  < , since by
Proposition 1 x > 0 then @(S F )@ < 0.
Similarly
@h(x;)
@ =
@(S F )
@ =  
h
(  x)V
(  x)T++x +
(  x)V
1  x (  x)T
i
+(  )
h
 V 
((  x)T++x)2 +
 V (1 )
(1  x (  x)T )2
i (9)
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Again the denominators are always positive and if  > , then @(S F )@ < 0 since (  x)
and (  ) are positive, similarly if  < , then @(S F )@ > 0.
5 Discussion
5.1 Targeted training or productivity enhancement
Our model allows for di¤erent kinds of training, or productivity enhancing technology. In
the model, increasing  and increasing  can both increase the ability of agents, and can
readily be interpreted as the result of training directed towards di¤erent types of agents or
di¤erent kinds of productivity-enhancing technologies. A rm may wonder whether there
is much di¤erence, for example, in giving employees access to a database that expands
their core knowledge (increasing ) or giving them access to software that allows for more
e¤ective work (increasing ).
As demonstrated in Proposition 4, these two means of increasing average ability have
exactly opposite e¤ects for equilibrium e¤ort. In particular for low values of  when an
agent would like employers to believe that she is a low ttype then raising the ability of a
low ttype relatively more than raising the ability of a high ttype (either by decreasing
 or by increasing ) heightens this reputational concern. As discussed below, it does so
through two channels, by raising the pecuniary value of showing oneself to be a higher type
and by making the outcome more informative about the agents type.
Similarly in the case where  is high, then agents with high t are the most productive
and a greater distinction between the most able and the least able (here by increasing
 or decreasing ) will heighten the reputational concern for agents seeking to convince
consumers that they are the most able.
Thus in all cases raising the productivity of the most able agents (or reducing the
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productivity of the least able) increases the equilibrium e¤ort.
5.2 Recruitment policies and searching for superstars
While training as described above a¤ects the productivity of a given type and thereby
a¤ects the prior beliefs about an agents productivity, interviewing and recruitment policies
directly a¤ect the initial belief about the distribution of types g(t). When employers seek
recruitment policies which select better agents, there are various ways in which this can
be achieved. Consider the case when  is high (so that types with high values of t are the
better agents); a recruitment policy that selects better agents will lead to a shift in the
prior distribution from g(t) with associated T and V , to a di¤erent prior distribution g0(t)
with associated T 0 > T and V 0. Following Proposition 2, among all policies with the same
e¤ect on average ability (that generate the same T 0), an employer would prefer to choose
a policy that raised rather than reduced the variance of the distribution. When superstars
and disastrous potential recruits are rare, then it follows that employers concerned with
employeese¤orts would be better using recruitment policies that concentrated more on
ensuring that any potential superstars were recruited than ruling out the worst of the
applicants.8
8For example, suppose that with no recruitment policy, types are distributed according to the degenerate
distribution g(0) = 1
10
; g( 1
2
) = 4
5
and g(1) = 1
10
so that T = 1
2
and V = 1
20
. Now consider, two recruitment
policies which raise the average ability, one does so by reducing the probability of recruiting disasters.
Specically Policy A leads to the distribution gA(0) = 120 , gA(
1
2
) = 17
20
, and gA(1) = 110 so that TA =
21
40
and VA = 120 (
21
40
)2 + 17
20
( 1
40
)2 + 1
10
( 19
40
)2 = 59
1600
. Policy B increases the probability of identifying
superstars and leads to the distribution gB(0) = 110 , gB(
1
2
) = 3
4
, and gB(1) = 320 , then TB =
21
40
and
VB =
1
10
( 21
40
)2 + 3
4
( 1
40
)2 + 3
20
( 19
40
)2 = 99
1600
. Since VB > VA it follows by Proposition 2 that, while both
policies raise average ability equally, the latter policy would lead to greater equilibrium e¤ort compared to
the rst and so would be preferred.
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5.3 The information and value e¤ects
By adapting the model slightly to suppose that in period 2 a type t agent succeeds with
probability t0+(1  t)0, we can distinguish between two channels through which changes
in ability as discussed in Proposition 4 and Section 5.1 a¤ect incentives. Specically, in
this modied model S   F = (0   0)
h
(  x)V
(  x)T++x +
(  x)V
1  x (  x)T
i
and similar
qualitative results apply.
Proposition 5 Equilibrium e¤ort is increasing in  and 0 but decreasing in  and 0
when ; 0 <  but decreasing in  and 0 and increasing in  and 0 when ; 0 > .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4, it is su¢ cient to consider @(S F )@ ,
@(S F )
@0 ,
@(S F )
@ ,and
@(S F )
@0 .
First
@(S   F )
@0
=
(    x)V
(    x)T + + x +
(    x)V
1    x  (    x)T (10)
which is negative when  <  but positive when  > . Similarly,
@(S   F )
@0
=   (    x)V
(    x)T + + x  
(    x)V
1    x  (    x)T (11)
which is positive when  <  but negative when  > .
Next
@(S   F )
@
= (0   0)

(+ x)V
((    x)T + + x)2 +
(1    x)V
(1    x  (    x)T )2

, and
(12)
@(S   F )
@
= (0   0)
  V T
((    x)T + + x)2 +
 V (1  )
(1    x  (    x)T )2

. (13)
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 4, the derivatives have the signs claimed in the
relevant parameter ranges.
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Thus Proposition 5 demonstrates that the overall e¤ect of changing the abilities of
types through changes to  and  described in Proposition 4 can be decomposed into two
distinct mechanisms.
First consider the comparative statics with respect to the second period productivities
0, and 0. Fixing some e¤ort level, then the beliefs about the type of an agent following
either a success or a failure do not change as 0 or 0 changes. However, since the belief
that the agent is excellent following a success is higher than it is following a failure, raising
(lowering) 0 in the case where 0 >  (where 0 < ) increases S the agents wage fol-
lowing a success by more than it increases F , the wage following failure. Since incentives
are stronger the greater the di¤erence between S and F , an increase in 0 therefore raises
incentives. A similar argument applies for 0. Notice that changing 0, and 0 does not
a¤ect the inferences that employers draw from the outcomes (in equilibrium when they
correctly anticipate x) but they a¤ect the value to the agent of being thought of as a par-
ticular type. We therefore term this channel for inuencing an agents incentives a value
e¤ect.
We now turn to the comparative statics with respect to the rst period productivities
through changes in , and . If the beliefs about the type of the agent are xed, then
increasing , and  has no e¤ect whatsoever on the value of the agent in Period 2. Changing
 and , however, can a¤ect the inferences that employers draw from an observation of
success or failure, we therefore term such changes as having an information e¤ect. In
particular, intuition can be drawn from the observation that for a xed level of e¤ort,
increasing (reducing)  in the case where  >  (where  < ) increases the probability that
better types generate success and decreases the probability that they generate failure.
Therefore, conditional on observing on a success, employers believe that the agent is more
likely to be at the top of the ability distribution and so S is higher, while conditional
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on observing a failure, employers believe that the agent is less likely to be at the top of
the distribution and so F is lower. In particular, therefore, (S   F ) increases. Similar
arguments apply with regard to changes in .
5.4 Reputation for excellence or ineptitude
This paper relates to a wider literature on reputation. Much of the economic literature
on reputation has focused on a reputation for excellence (trying to show that you are a
type who always does well, or where reputation is about who youd like to be).9 In
these models, the most able are non strategic and implicitly, they are assumed to be
somewhat unusual or scarce, so for example with that view of the world, one might expect
general untargeted training to have little e¤ect on them. Such training would reduce
career concern incentives.
More recent literature (Mailath and Samuelson [2001], Tadelis [2002], Bar-Isaac [2007])
and common intuition suggests that often reputational concerns might also relate to avoid-
ing a reputation for ineptitude (trying to show that you are not an inept type who always
does badly or where reputation is about who youre not) where the top of the distribu-
tion is the strategic type, and the bottom of the distribution is an inept types whom one
might expect to be little a¤ected by training.
The distinction between these two approaches to reputation has been forcibly made
by Mailath and Samuelson [1998] who highlight, in particular, that the latter view of
9Following Kreps and Wilson [1982] and Milgrom and Roberts [1982] and later Fudenberg and Levine
[1989], the formal economic literature on reputation has been used primarily to discuss beliefs about the
type of the agent. Previous literature (Klein and Le­ er [1981] for example) and a great deal of intuition has
also used the term in a somewhat looser fashion to consider sustaining certain actions in innitely repeated
games. As highlighted in Fudenberg and Levine [1989] this corresponds closely to the notion of reputation
where reputation is a concern to show that youre a Stackelberg type that is a type whose behavior a
strategic agent would like to promise to commit to similar to what we term later in this note a reputation
for excellence. See Bar-Isaac and Tadelis [2007] for a review of this literature and alternative approaches
to reputation.
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reputation leads to increasing certainty about the agents type over time and so reputational
incentives disappear over time unless type uncertainty is continually introduced.10
In practice, it is far from obvious whether it is more appropriate to think of agents as
particularly concerned that others should think them to be excellent or that they should
not think them to be inept. However, as we illustrate, modelling reputational concerns in
these two ways can lead to opposite conclusions.
This paper highlights an important distinction between the two approaches in a simple
two-period model. Specically, following the intuition of the paragraphs above, making
the strategic agent more e¢ cient diminishes reputational concerns (reducing e¤ort) when
reputation is about excellence but increases reputational concerns when reputation is about
ineptitude.
To see this more clearly consider setting  = 1 and the degenerate distribution g(0) =
1 p and g(1) = p. This corresponds to a fairly typical model where type t = 0 corresponds
to the strategic type whose reputational concern is to try to convince customers that she
is the excellentor Stackelberg type. Following Proposition 2, in this case improving the
strategic agent by raising  would reduce e¤ort.
In contrast suppose that a strategic agents reputational concern is to avoid a reputation
for ineptitude. This corresponds to the model where  = 0 with g(0) = 1  p and g(1) = p
and in this case improving the strategic agent by raising  would increase equilibrium
e¤ort.
10Further in Mailath and Samuelson [1998], the model is constructed in such a way that there is unravelling
so that if there are no reputational incentives at some point, there are no such incentives throughout.
The more general point on reputational incentives disappearing over time without some kind of replen-
ishment of type uncertainty applies more widely. Indeed, Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson [2004] show this
to be the case unless actions are perfectly observable, even in the case when reputation is about excellence
and a competent agent can perfectly mimic an excellent agent (though incentives may disappear only in
the very long run).
Bar-Isaac [2007] suggests an endogenous mechanism to maintain type uncertainty by allowing agents to
choose to work in teams. Liu [2007] supposes that receivers must pay to observe history. This also provides
an endogenous mechanism which limits an audiences certainty about type.
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It is worth noting that in those papers that have considered something akin to the inept
type we consider in this paper (in particular Diamond [1989], Mailath and Samuelson [1998],
Tadelis [2002] and Bar-Isaac [2007]), there are no reputational incentives from trying to
avoid a reputation for ineptitude or gain a reputation for competence per se.11 Essentially
this is because in the notation of this paper they have taken  = 0.
5.5 Many periods
Extending the model beyond two periods is not straightforward. First, in a multi-period
model, the agents belief about herself (and in particular whether she knows her type)
will make a di¤erence. This belief will a¤ect her expectations of continuation values in
all periods up until the last one, and so a modeler must take a stance on this belief.12
Second, with many time periods and di¤erent types, there are many equilibrium conditions
that need to be simultaneously satised. For example, a decision on how much e¤ort
to exert with two periods remaining must take into account not only the agents type
but also expectations of what e¤orts she will take (and what e¤orts the public would
anticipate and so compensate) in subsequent periods. Similarly, e¤orts in later periods
depend on reputations that arise as a result of e¤orts in earlier periods. In contrast to the
single equilibrium condition (4) that appears in this model, in a multi-period extension one
needs to solve a system of non-linear equations. This makes an analytical characterization
challenging, though for a nite-period (if not an innite horizon) model one can proceed
by backwards induction, where the analysis of the penultimate period would be identical
11 In those papers, it is only useful to be thought of as a competent type if you can somehow also commit
to exerting e¤ort. Diamond also allows for an inept type that always fails, but has a strategic type for
whom  = 0, Cabral and Hortacsu [2004] is an exception in supposing that  6= 0.
12Note also that if the agent does not know her type initially, she will learn it at a di¤erent rate to
customers, as she observes whether or not she has made a strategic decision and the level of e¤ort (which
would be relevant for considering o¤-equilibrium deviations) and not just the outcome, which is all that the
public observes.
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to our two-period model.
We numerically analyze a three period version of our model in a Appendix B, in which
all the qualitative results of the two period model appear to be robust.13 Nevertheless,
although a number of forces operate in the same way and dominate in the many numerical
parametrizations we have explored, there are some subtle and potentially counter-acting
mechanisms. These can be understood by distinguishing between information and value
e¤ects,as we did in Section 5.3.
The information e¤ect works as described above: increasing  in the case that e¤ort and
ability are complements or  when they are substitutes suggests that, all else equal, out-
comes are more informative signals on ability. As long as the value of entering the second
period with a given reputation is non-decreasing, then since outcomes are more informa-
tive, the agent will be induced to exert more e¤ort. In the case where e¤ort and ability
are substitutes, then following Proposition 1(ii) the agent always prefers that potential
employers think she is better (and so more likely to be succeeding with probability ) than
exerting e¤ort (in particular the very best agent t = 1 has no opportunity to exert e¤ort).
In this case therefore, the value with two remaining periods is indeed non-decreasing in
reputation. It is theoretically possible however, that it can be non-monotonic when e¤ort
and ability are complements. In this case, even the best possible agent (that is one of type
t = 0) would prefer to commit to exerting e¤ort. With no means to do so, the agent may
13Note that there is an additional complication: it is not clear what would constitute an analogous result
in the case of a mutli-period extension. There are a number of di¤erent e¤orts that characterize equilibrium
(specically equilibrium e¤ort would be a function of the agents belief about her type, the publics belief
about the agents type and the number of periods remaining). In considering comparative statics, it is
not clear what the appropriate multi-period analogue of our results should be: e¤ort in the rst period
given an initial reputation (prior distrinution), e¤orts in any period, given an initial reputation, or perhaps
of greater interest might be the overall lifetime expected e¤ort. Although we have not included it in the
model, this would be particularly relevant in an environment where the initial employers competed both
with respect to wages and recruitment/training policies. Employees would compete by o¤ering workers
recruitment/training policies that led to more e¢ cient decisions for lifetime earnings.
Our results appear to be robust with respect to all of these measures.
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benet more from uncertainty about her ability which induces her to exert e¢ cient e¤ort
than from having potential employers certain that she is excellent (and thereby dampening
her incentives for e¤ort). Although, this is a theoretical possibility, we have been unable
to nd numerical examples.14
In both cases, where e¤ort and ability are substitutes or complements, the value e¤ect
can be decomposed into two e¤ects. Consider, increasing  in the complements case for
the second and third periods but not for the rst period. First, one can think of a direct
value e¤ect, betteragents are more productive as in the main model and so agents should
seek to prove themselves to better, leading to similar comparative statics. However, there
is an additional indirect value e¤ect, which is that second period e¤orts are altered,
as described in the main model. Specically, these increase at all reputation levels. It
is theoretically conceivable that second period e¤orts might increase so much more for
a second period reputation that arises following a rst period failure than a rst period
success that it dampens rst period incentives.
Overall, therefore the directvalue e¤ect boost e¤orts, as will the information e¤ect
in the case where e¤ort and ability are substitutes. Although, the indirectvalue e¤ects
(in both cases) and the information e¤ect when e¤ort and ability are complements might
possibly work in the opposite direction, we have been unable to nd examples in which our
qualitative results on comparative statics are overturned in a three period extension of the
model.15
14Further, there is intuition to suggest that this cannot arise. Such a result requires that the e¤ort
generated in equilibrium is valuable as compared to raw ablity (). However, raw ability must be
signicant enough to generate equilibrium e¤ort in the rst place.
15Given the intuitions in this section, we have searched in particular in the e¤ort and abilities as com-
plements case (where the information e¤ect is ambiguous) and in the case where the initial reputation is
high (that is where the agent is very likely to be strategic) since here following rst period success there is
likely to be much less uncertainty (and so relatively low e¤ort) as compared to failure.
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6 Summary
At heart this paper highlights the simple observation that the distribution of prior beliefs
is a crucial determinant of reputational incentives. There are numerous considerations
which a¤ect such prior beliefs, including for example contemporaries and social peers.
Further, there are many policies that rms undertake (in particular, we have focused on
training and recruitment policies) which a¤ect the shape of the distribution of these priors.
Di¤erent policies which a¤ect the mean ability in the same way can have exactly opposite
implications for reputational concerns.
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A Derivation of S(x) and F (x)
Suppose that the equilibrium e¤ort level is given by x. Then a type t agent generates success in
the rst period with probability
t+ (1  t)(+ x) = (    x)t+ (+ x), (14)
and generates a failure with probability
1  t  (1  t)(+ x) = 1    x  t(    x). (15)
By Bayes rule, the probability density function given a success and given the belief that agents
exert e¤ort x in the rst period can be written down as
s(t; x) =
(    x)t+ + xR 1
0
[(    x)t+ + x] g(t)dt
g(t) =
(    x)t+ + x
(    x)T + (+ x)g(t), (16)
and the probability density function given a failure in the rst period is
f(t; x) =
1  (    x)t  (+ x)R 1
0
[1  (    x)t  (+ x)] g(t)dt
g(t) =
1  (    x)t  (+ x)
1  (    x)T   (+ x)g(t). (17)
In the second period, an agent of type t will exert no e¤ort and so succeed with probability
t + (1   t) = t(   ) + . In particular it follows, that if employers believed that the types
were distributed according to h(:) going into period 2 then they would be willing to pay the agentR 1
0
(t(  ) + )h(t)dt.
It follows that the wage that employers would pay following success and failure respectively are
given by:
S(x) =
Z 1
0
(t(  ) + )s(t; x)dt = (  )E [tjS; x] + , and (18)
F (x) =
Z 1
0
(t(  ) + )f(t; x)dt = (  )E [tjF; x] + , (19)
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where
E [tjS; x] =
Z 1
0
ts(t; x)dt = T +
(    x)V
(    x)T + (+ x) , and (20)
E [tjF; x] =
Z 1
0
tf(t; x)dt = T   (    x)V
(1    x)  (    x)T . (21)
Proof. of Proposition 1
We begin by proving (i) and (ii) for any equilibirium e¤ort e.
(i) Notice that S(x) < 1 for all x and F (x) > 0 for all x; so in particular S() F () < 1, then
the equilibrium e¤ort level
e

= S(e)  F (e) < 1 =) e <  (22)
(ii) For contradiction suppose that     e < 0; then consider
S(e)  F (e) = (  )(    e
)V
[T + (+ e)(1  T )] [1    e   (    e)T ] (23)
Note that 1      e > T (      e) since T < 1 and 1 >  so the denominator is positive
and since  >  and    e < 0 it follows that S(e) F (e) < 0 but then it is impossible that
S(e)  F (e) = e > 0, which is our desired contradiction.
It su¢ ces to show that there exists a unique solution for the equation (4), which is in the range
(0; ).
Let h(x) =  x +S(x) F (x). The equilibrium e¤ort is then given by the solution of h(e) = 0
for e 2 (0; ):
Note that h(0) = S(0) F (0) > 0 and given (i) and (ii), h(0) > 0 and h() < 0: Moreover, h(x)
is continuous, and thus there exists at least one solution in the range (0; ).
In order to demonstrate uniqueness, rst take the derivative of (S   F ):
d(S   F )
dx
=  (  )V [ 
[(    x)T + (+ x)]2 +
(1  )
[(1    x)  (    x)T ]2 ] (24)
Then if  > , d(S F )dx < 0 and so h(x) is monotonically decreasing in the range (0; ) and so
the solution must be unique.
If  <  then d(S F )dx > 0 and so potentially, h(x) could be increasing in some subset of (0; )
(note that since h(0) > 0 and h() < 0 at must be decreasing in some of the range). However, we
know that, when  < , d
3h(x)
dx3 > 0 since
d3h(x)
d3x
= (  )V [ 6(1  T )
2
[(    x)T + + x]4 +
(1  )6(1  T )2
[1    x  (    x)T ]2 ] > 0 (25)
Suppose for a contradiction that h(e) = 0 has a number of solutions 0 < e1 < : : : < eN < .
Then rst note that since h(0) > 0 and h() < 0 then N must be an odd number. In particular
therefore if there are multiple solutions to h(e) in the range then there must be at least three.
However h(0) > 0 and 0 < e1 < e2 < e3 with h(e1) = h(e2) = h(e3) = 0 requires
dh(e1)
dx < 0,
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dh(e2)
dx > 0 and
dh(e3)
dx < 0 which contradicts
d3h(x)
d3x > 0.
B Three period, two type model
There are two types of agents parameterized by 0  t  T  1.
Production is as in the main model. Specically in each period, a type i agent will have
no strategic decision to make with probability i and in this case will succeed (for example by
producing a high quality product) with probability  and fails with probability 1   . Otherwise
(with probability 1 i) the agent must make an e¤ort decision. In this latter case, when she chooses
e¤ort e, she succeeds with probability  + e. Thus overall an i-type agent exerting e¤ort e when
given the opportunity to exert e¤ort would succeed with probability i + (1   i)( + e) and fail
otherwise. E¤ort is costly and, specically, exerting e¤ort e costs the agent e
2
2 .
Let rj denote the publics belief that the agent is of type t at time j. Note that in contrast to
the two period case, for multiple periods, it will make a di¤erence whether we assume that agents
know their own types or not. Here we assume that agents do not know their own types initially.
Therefore if they observe that they have an e¤ort decision to make they gain some information
about their type. We can write the private, intermediate belief after observing an opportunity to
exert e¤ort as p1 =
r1(1 T )
r1(1 T )+(1 r1)(1 t) .
As before, employers are risk neutral, value a success at 1 and a failure at 0 and they Bertrand
compete for the agents service in each period. Moreover, outcomes are observable but e¤ort is not
observable and contracts are incomplete, so that in e¤ect an agent is paid in advance at a wage
which is simply the employerscommon belief that the agent will produce a success.
There are three periods of trade, and outcomes are observed (and beliefs revised) at the end of
each period. Specically timing is as follows:
1. Period 1
(a) employers Bertrand compete for the agents service
(b) the agent observes whether or not a task where she has an opportunity to exert e¤ort
arises, and updates her belief about her ability and then decides the level of e¤ort if
appropriate (that is if it is a task where e¤ort will make a di¤erence)
(c) success/failure commonly observed
(d) employers update beliefs according to Bayes rule
2. Period 2
(a) employers Bertrand compete for the agents service
(b) the agent decides the level of e¤ort if appropriate (that is if it is a task where e¤ort will
make a di¤erence)
(c) success/failure commonly observed
(d) employers update beliefs according to Bayes rule
3. Period 3: employers Bertrand compete for the agents service
We suppose that agents weigh the periods equally and that agents maximize the sum of prots
for the three periods and we solve for the e¤ort exerted in the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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B.1 Solving the model
Work by backwards induction.
B.1.1 Period 3
In the nal period neither type exerts e¤ort.
Suppose that an agent enters this last period L with reputation r3 (probability of being T type)
then regardless of his type, he earns
r3(T+ (1  T )) + (1  r3)(t+ (1  t)) = + (  )t+ (T   t)(  )r3
So we can write the values for type t and T to entering the third period with reputation r3
respectively as
V t3 (r3) = V
T
3 (r3) = V3(r3) = + (  )t+ (T   t)(  )r3. (26)
B.1.2 Period 2
Following the analysis in the two-period model, then both types of agent will exert the same e¤ort
(that is xt2 = x
T
2 = x2) which will be a function of r2 the reputation at the start of period 2, which
will in turn determine the equilibrium expectation of e¤ort xe2 (so that this is a function of r2,
though we often suppress this argument to avoid burdensome notation) and in particular this e¤ort
is
x2(r2)

= (T   t)(  )(rS3 (xe2; r2)  rF3 (xe2; r2)),
where
rS3 (r2) =
r2(T+ (1  T )(+ xe2(r2)))
r2(T+ (1  T )(+ xe2(r2))) + (1  r2)(t+ (1  t)(+ xe2(r2)))
, and
rF3 (r2) =
r2(1  T  (1  T )(+ xe2(r2)))
r2(1  T  (1  T )(+ xe2(r2))) + (1  r2)(1  t  (1  t)(+ xe2(r2)))
.
Of course, as in the paper, one must worry about interiority and the existence and uniqueness of
the solution, though for now we take these for granted and return later to verify them numerically.
We can then write down the second period value as a function of both the public belief r2 and
the agents private belief, p1
V t2 (r2) =
r2(T+ (1  T )(+ xe2(r2)) + (1  r2)(t+ (1  t)(+ xe2(r2)))+
p1((T+ (1  T )(+ xe2(r2)))V3(rs3) + (1  T  (1  T )(+ xe2(r2)))V3(r3f )  (1  T ) (x
e
2(r2))
2
2 )+
(1  p1)((t+ (1  t)(+ xe2(r2)))V3(rs3) + (1  t  (1  t)(+ xe2(r2)))V3(r3f )  (1  t) (x
e
2(r2))
2
2 )
B.1.3 Period 1
Finally, if the initial reputation is r1 and the public anticipates e¤orts xe1 then we can write
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rs2 =
r1(T+ (1  T )(+ xe1))
r1(T+ (1  T )(+ xe1)) + (1  r1)(t+ (1  t)(+ xe1))
; and
rf2 =
r1(1  T  (1  T )(+ xe1))
r1(1  T  (1  T )(+ xe1)) + (1  r1)(1  t  (1  t)(+ xe1))
Then rst period e¤ort would solve16 :
x1

= V2(r
s
2)  V T2 (rf2 ) (27)
B.1.4 Equilibrium conditions
The conditions for equilibrium are
x1 = x
e
1
x2(r
s
2) = x
e
2(r
s
2)
x2(r
f
2 ) = x
e
2(r
f
2 )
Note in particular, that while the two-period model had a single (non-linear) equation to be
satised. Here with two types and three periods, there are three non-linear equations which must
be simultaneously satised. We were unable to solve that model analytically but it can be solved
numerically..
B.2 Numerical Calculations
We have conducted many simulations by setting all parameters values of the model but one or two
that we allow to vary over a specic range. For those specic values of the parameters we solved
the previous system of non-linear equations and we have computed the exerted e¤orts levels that
are the endogenous variables of the model. Finally, we have successfully checked the comparative
statics results of the paper.17 In doing so, it is important to notice that in the two period model
of the paper there was only one level of exerted e¤ort. However, in this extended version of the
model we have to compute three e¤ort levels: e¤ort exerted in period one, e¤ort exerted in period
two after a success and e¤ort exerted in period two after a failure. In order to be able to compare
both models, we take an ex-ante point of view and we aggregate these three e¤ort levels into a new
variable lifetime expected e¤ort. This variable is the expected exerted e¤ort in the three period,
which is a weighted average of the three e¤ort levels (weighted by the prior belief and probabilities
of rst period success and failure).
16Note that the agents choice of action does not a¤ect her private belief about herself p1, rather her
action in the second period is a function only of her public reputation. Therefore there is no gain from
deviating in rst period to try to generate private information or distort in that way, so we not need to
consider such e¤ects.
17Our Matlab code and instructions for the numerical calculations are available online at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~hbar-isa
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In the following, we will provide two scenarios that illustrate two of the main results of the
paper. Let t = 0:2 and T = 0:8 be the two types, meaning that type t (T )will have no strategic
decision to make with probability 0:2 (0:8).
We consider rst the case of creativework where e¤ort and ability are complements. Suppose
that when having no opportunity to exert e¤ort then both types will succeed with probability
 = 0. In case that the agent will have to exert e¤ort, then an agent succeeds with probability
 + e, where  varies in this simulation between 0:1 and 0:4, and the inverse of the marginal cost
of e¤ort, , varies between 0:04 and 0:3. Finally, the publics belief that the agent is of type t at
time 1 is r1 = 0:5. Given this set of parameters, we solve the non-linear system numerically and we
compute e¤orts for di¤erent values of  and . The gure below shows a two dimensional surface
to illustrate how lifetime expected e¤ort varies with the probability of success  and the inverse of
the marginal cost 
The mu=0 case
The gure above shows the lifetime e¤ort jointly increases in both  and , as predicted in
Propositions 2 and 4. Notice, that the relationship between lifetime e¤ort and ; depends on
whether or not,  is larger than : The previous gure illustrate the case in which  >  = 0.
We analyze the opposite case (routine work or where e¤ort and ability are substitutes) by
keeping the same parameter values but for changing  to  = 1. The theoretical prediction is that,
the e¤ort must be decreasing in .
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The mu=1 case
The gure above shows that in this case (that is when  <  = 1) the lifetime e¤ort decreases
on  as is predicted in Proposition 4.
Our purpose with these examples is to show that the driving forces in the two period model
play an important role in the extended model, and hence it is easy to nd regular examples that are
consistent with our predicted results. However, we have to acknowledge that there several caveats:
i) We rely on the numerical Matlab procedure to solve our non-linear system, this procedure works
well with interior solutions but not as well with extreme values of the parameters. ii) The numerical
solutions are regular, and they behave smoothly with small changes in the parameters. Hence, we
think that the solution is unique and hence our comparative static argument holds, however we do
not have a formal proof of this uniqueness.
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